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Society's nsmg anxieties about sexual abuse lead us to employ 
seemingly ineffectual, yet oppressive, legislative tools to control and 
prevent it. This essay examines these growing fears and resulting 
legislation through the lens of moral panic and risk society theories. 
Sex offender legislation is both disproportionate and misdirected 
because of a distortion in the process of risk detection. In a risk 
society, people become overwhelmed with increasing industrial 
threats they are unable to control or even comprehend. A moral 
panic, the quintessential witch-hunt, can represent a comprehensible 
risk within risk society. Regulation of crime becomes a tangible way 
to control risk and quell fears. In sex offender legislation, we see the 
efforts of an overanxious risk society to assuage that anxiety by 
branding and banishing deviants, which is a classic moral panic 
approach to controlling the threat. 
Indeed, scholars have described the sexual abuse movement as a 
sex panic, or moral panic. 15 While many similarities exist to moral 
panic, I argue that that explanation is insufficient. A moral panic is a 
sudden eruption of hostility towards a specific group out of 
proportion to any harm they cause. 16 In the case at hand, released sex 
offenders are the focal point for all anxiety: They represent 
sensationalized deviants who threaten the sanctity of the community 
and its children. 17 The state of perpetual moral anxiety out of which 
sex offender legislation arises is similar to a moral panic, but is 
expressed in the context of a risk society and legislated as a risk 
society fear. 18 
The risk society is a period we have entered in late modernity 
where anxiety over manufactured risks overwhelms other worries, 
creating a world fraught with insecurity and unpredictability. 19 There 
is no specific group to hold directly responsible; nevertheless, 
intangible, indefinable risks consume us. 20 Concerns over sex 
15. See, e.g., Daniel M. Filler, Terrorism, Panic, and Pedophilia, 10 VA. 1. Soc. POL'y & 
L. 345, 347-48 (2003); Janice M. Irvine, Transient Feelings: Sex Panics and the 
Politics of Emotions, 14 GLQ: J. LESBIAN & GAY STUD. 1 (2007). 
16. See STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS: THE CREATION OF THE MODS 
AND ROCKERS xxii (Routledge, 3d ed. 2002) (1972). 
17. See Filler, supra note 15, at 360. 
18. See discussion infra Part Il.B (discussing sex offender scares as moral panics); Part 
111.8 (analyzing how sex offender moral panics are used to reduce anxieties in our risk 
society). 
19. See Sheldon Ungar, Moral Panic Versus the Risk Society: The Implications of the 
Changing Sites of Social Anxiety, 52 BRIT. J. Soc. 271, 282 (2001). 
20. See Marc R. Poirier, "It Was the Best of Times, It Was the Worst of Times . .. ": 
Science, Rhetoric and Distribution in a Risky World, 53 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 409, 
428-29 (2002). 
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Across the country, civil sanctions for sex offenders are increasing. 
Society's rising anxieties about sexual abuse lead us to employ 
seemingly ineffectual yet oppressive legislative tools to control and 
prevent it. This essay examines these growing fears and resulting 
legislation through the lens of moral panic and risk society theories. 
In a risk society as envisioned by scholar Ulrich Beck, people become 
overwhelmed with increasing industrial threats they are unable to 
control or even comprehend. A moral panic, the quintessential 
witch-hunt, can represent a comprehensible risk within risk society. 
Regulation of crime becomes a tangible way to control risk and quell 
fears. Through sex offender legislation, we an over-anxious risk 
society attempts to assuage that anxiety by branding and banishing 
deviants, a classic moral panic approach to controlling the threat. 
Scholars have conventionally described the sexual abuse movement 
as a sex panic, or moral panic. While many similarities exist to 
moral panic, I argue that that explanation is insufficient. Sex 
offender legislation cannot be explained by solely a moral panic or 
risk society theory. Rather, it is important to understand this regime 
as a moral panic created in and molded by a risk society, producing 
a state of perpetual moral anxiety. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Across the country, civil sanctions for sex offenders are 
multiplying. 1 In addition to existing federal legislation, state and 
local governments are enacting increasingly strict regulations. 2 In 
California, someone convicted for public urination is forever branded 
as a sex offender. 3 In twenty-eight states, statutory rape is a strict 
liability crime, but remains a registerable sex offense. 4 In other 
states, so is obscenity and false imprisonment of a minor. 5 A 
formerly incarcerated sex offender can find life outside almost as 
1. Sarah E. Agudo, Comment, Irregular Passion: The Unconstitutionality and Inefficacy 
of Sex Offender Residency Laws, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 307, 308 (2008). 
2. See discussion infra Part l.B. 
3. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 314.1 (West 2008). 
4. See Catherine L. Carpenter, The Constitutionality of Strict Liability in Sex Offender 
Registration Laws, 86 B.U. L. REv. 295, 324-25 (2006). 
5. See Steven R. Morrison, Creating Sex Offender Registries: The Religious Right and 
the Failure to Protect Society's Vulnerable, 35 AM. J. CRIM. L. 23, 45 (2007) 
(obscenity); Ofer Raban, Be They Fish or Not Fish: The Fishy Registration 0/ 
Nonsexual Offenders, 16 WM. & MARY BILL Rrs. J. 497, 497 (2007) (false 
imprisonment). 
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restrictive as in prison. 6 Twenty-two states now have residency 
restrictions for sex offenders. 7 In Florida, a sex offender cannot live 
within one thousand feet of any "place where children regularly 
congregate.,,8 In Louisiana, they are banned from living near video 
arcades. 9 In Fort Lauderdale, sex offenders are paroled to live under 
bridges; parole officers can find no other locations that conform to 
local statutes. 10 
The increasing legislation is inspired by proliferating fears about 
sexual abuse and seeks to quell those fears by defining and 
controlling the threat. II The civil regime permanently brands a small 
sector of ex-offenders with criminal status. 12 Offenders shift from 
being persons convicted of certain acts to becoming permanent 
carriers of an inherently degraded status. In this way, the legislation 
effectively banishes sex offenders from the community.13 Despite the 
rapidly increasing scope and severity of the civil legislation, the 
majority of sexual abuse continues unabated, in part because public 
attention and enforcement efforts focus on stranger offenders, while 
friends and family commit at least ninety percent of child sexual 
abuse. 14 
6. See Mark Louden-Brown, Note, "They Set Him on a Path Where He's Bound to Get 
Ill": Why Sex Offender Residency Restrictions Should Be Abandoned, 62 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 795, 795 (i007). 
7. See Chiraag Bains, Next-Generation Sex Offender Statutes: Constitutional Challenges 
to ReSidency, Work, and Loitering Restrictions, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 483, 483 
& n.5 (2007). 
8. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 947.1405(7)(a)(2) (West 2001 & Supp. 2009). 
9. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.1.A(2) (West Supp. 2009). 
10. Isaiah Thompson, Sex Offenders Set Up Camp; The Julia Tuttle Becomes a Colony; 
Politicians Pass the Buck, MIAMI NEW TIMES, Dec. 13, 2007, 
http://www.miaminewtimes.comJ2007 -12-13/news/sex-offenders-set-up-camp/fuIV. 
11. See discussion infra Part lII.e. 
12. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text (reviewing increasingly stricter state-
residency requirements applicable to those branded as sex offenders for acts deemed 
criminal by state legislatures including public urination, statutory rape, obscenity, and 
false imprisonment). 
13. See Michael 1. Duster, Note, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: State Attempts to Banish Sex 
Offenders, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 711,717-18 (2005). 
14. National Child Abuse Statistics: Child Abuse in America, CHILDHELP, 
http://www.childhelp.org/pages/statistics (last visited Jan. 8, 2011); see also Jennifer 
M. Collins, Lady Madonna, Children at Your Feet: The Criminal Justice System's 
Romanticization of the Parent-Child Relationship, 93 IOWA L. REv. 131, 133, 150, 
157 (2007) (reiterating that only three percent of the defendants who sexually 
assaulted children under the age of six were strangers); Duster, supra note 13, at 717 
("[E]vidence [shows] that individuals known by the [child] victim [are] most likely to 
be the offenders of concern. "). 
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offenders become a way to quell greater anxiety, as a concrete 
problem with concrete objects that can be acted against, unlike other 
risk society risks. The surrounding circumstances create a moral 
panic that is longer and more insidious than that anticipated by 
classic moral panic theory. The fact that sex offenders seem to be a 
defined, controllable risk justifies ever-increasing surveillance and 
governmental intrusion. The result is an escalating system of laws 
that will not fade away, trapping society into a perpetual witch-hunt. 
The anxieties of a risk society sustain a moral panic that might 
otherwise subside. 21 
Sex offender legislation cannot be explained solely by a moral 
panic or risk society theory. Rather, it is important to understand this 
regime as a moral panic created in and molded by a risk society. This 
state of perPetual moral anxiety is expressed through the risk society 
and legislated as a risk society fear. 22 In particular, it uses typical 
resources and rule-making developed within the context of a risk 
society, such as increased state involvement and government 
surveillance. 23 
Understanding why sex offender legislation has developed in this 
disproportionate and misdirected manner is crucial to reforming this 
system. This reform is necessary because of the increasing impact of 
our dysfunctional sex offender regime on society.24 In this new 
paradigm, persons identified as "sex offenders" are targeted in a 
21. See Sean P. Hier, Risk and Panic in Late Modernity: Implications of the Converging 
Sites of Social Anxiety, 54 BRIT. J. SOC. 3, 6,18-19 (2003). 
22. See Duster, supra note 13, at 712; see also Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, 
The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its 
Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 453, 466 (1992) (noting the rising trend of penal 
systems targeting groups of people rather than individuals); Wendy Hollway & Tony 
Jefferson, The Risk Society in an Age of Anxiety: Situating Fear of Crime, 48 BRIT. J. 
SOC. 255, 263, 265 (1997) ("[D]iscourses that appear to ... produc[e] identifiable 
victims and blameable [sic] villains are likely to figure prominently in the State's 
ceaseless attempts to impose social order."). 
23. See ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY 78 (Mark Ritter, 
trans., 1992). 
24. See Agudo, supra note 1, at 337 ("[M]ost anti-crime groups would actually prefer that 
[sex offender] laws be narrowed."); Amber Leigh Bagley, Comment, An Era of 
Human Zoning: Banishing Sex Offenders From Communities Through Residence and 
Work Restrictions, 57 EMORY L.J., 1347, 1377-88 (2008) (arguing that human zoning 
regulations fail to protect children, create a false sense of security, increase 
recidivism, and stigmatize perpetrators instead of rehabilitating them). 
188 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 40 
manner uncorrelated to their statistical likelihood of re-offending. 25 
Offenders may have performed their required time, but they continue 
to carry their prisoner status with them, subject to ongoing regulation 
as well as social discrimination. Civil sanctions have become 
increasingly significant in defining the sex offender. 26 Legislative 
restrictions place ever-increasing controls on this group, creating a 
status that permanently determines what they can do, where they can 
live, and even which physical spaces they can occupy. 27 These laws 
transform offenders from persons convicted of certain acts to 
permanent carriers of an inherent degraded status, while ignoring the 
vast majority of offenders: friends and family members. 28 
Section I of this Article addresses sex offender legislation, focusing 
on the burgeoning historical development of sex panics and sex 
offender legislation. Section II defines moral panic and explores the 
ways in which the current anxieties over sex offenders are similar and 
dissimilar to the traditional moral panic. Section III discusses the risk 
society and examines the way that it transforms moral panic. 
II. SEX OFFENDER LEGISLATION 
A. Historical Development 
The first modem sex panic began in the mid-1930s when a set of 
murders in New York and Michigan brought about a state of "mass 
hysteria.,,29 In Chicago and New York City, local authorities initiated 
the first sexual offender registries. 30 Beginning in the mid-1940s, a 
spate of sexual crimes again brought the issue to the forefront. 31 
Subsequently, states passed various local "sexual psychopath" laws, 
allowing for extended commitment. 32 California enacted the first 
25. See Agudo, supra note 1, at 309; Jill S. Levenson & Leo P. Cotter, The Impact of Sex 
Offender Residence Restrictions: 1, 000 Feet from Danger or One Step from Absurd?, 
49 INT'LJ. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMPo CRIMINOLOGY 168, 168-69 (2005). 
26. See Bagley, supra note 24, at 1350-54. 
27. See Duster, supra note 13, at 718-19 n.41 (listing state laws that ban sex offenders 
from areas near schools, child-care facilities, parks, and other areas where children 
congregate). 
28. See Collins, supra note 14, at 164. 
29. ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, FEMINISM, SEXUALITY AND POLITICS 129 (Thadious M. Davis 
& Linda K. Kerber eds., 2006); PHILIP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS 
OF THE CHILD MOLESTER IN AMERICA 49-50 (1998). 
30. JENKINS, supra note 29, at 80. 
31. ld. at 52-55. 
32. ld. at 80-81. 
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statewide registration law in 1947. 33 The public encouraged the 
police in raids against "perverts"-which in practice meant any men 
found at the local gay bar. 34 These men often ended up incarcerated 
or institutionalized. 35 Outside of this context, however, the laws were 
rarely used. 36 The regulations were viewed as too harsh. 37 Moreover, 
the greater context for such government regulation was not in place. 38 
The populace balked at the intensive state intrusion required. 39 By 
the late 1950s, sexual offenders had dropped from the front page and 
continued in relative obscurity through the 1960s.40 
In the late 1970s, child sexual abuse again arose as a significant 
political issue. In this period period the phrase "child abuse" changed 
from referring to violence against children to being understood as 
child sexual abuse. 41 Public anxiety initially galvanized around child 
pornography rings. 42 In the late 1970s, a set of stranger abduction 
scandals also served to generate concern. 43 In this period, there was 
greater focus on rape and incest, as the growing feminist movement 
brought these issues to the forefront. 44 
33. Wayne A. Logan, Criminal Justice Federalism and National Sex Offender Policy, 6 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 51,61 (2008). 
34. See NEIL MILLER, SEX-CRIME PANIC: A JOURNEY TO THE PARANOID HEART OF THE 
1950s.108 (2002). Miller describes how "[o]n a single night in Baltimore in October 
1955, 162 men were arrested at a gay club .... [I]n Boise, Idaho, beginning in 
November 1955[, t]he arrest of three men on charges of sexual activity with teenage 
boys precipitated a massive witch hunt .... [where over] a 15-month period, some 
1,472 men were brought in for questioning." Id. at 108-09. 
35. Id. at 108-09, 121-22 ("Psychiatric hospitals often treated gay men and women with 
shock treatments, lobotomies, and aversion therapies."). 
36. See JENKINS, supra note 29, at 85-88. 
37. See id. at 89-90. 
38. See id. at 91-93. 
39. Id. at 116-17. 
40. See FREEDMAN, supra note 29, at 132, 134 (explaining that during the 1960s sexual 
psychopath laws came under criticism, and in 1968 Michigan actually repealed its 
sexual psychopath laws). 
41. Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 209, 220-
21 (2001). 
42. JENKINS, supra note 29, at 148-49. There was also a general "child abuse revolution," 
brought on by the work of feminists to create public awareness on the issues of rape 
and child sexual abuse. Id. at 118-19. This movement is not included here as a 
"moral panic" because it lacked the clear disproportionality aspect. See discussion 
infra Part II.A. 
43. See JENKINS, supra note 29, at 132-33 (discussing the media's treatment of serial 
killers like John Wayne Gacy and Randy Kraft, who committed sexual homicides 
against children and teenagers). 
44. Adler, supra note 41, at 221. 
190 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 40 
In the early 1980s, federal legislative hearings around child sexual 
assault and abduction resulted in the Missing Children's Assistance 
Act. 45 The focus, however, quickly changed to concern over child 
sex-rings, daycare center horrors, and satanic rituals. 46 Beginning in 
the late 1970s, there was an upsurge of interest in child pornography 
and focus on police action against "child pornography rings.,,47 This 
fear continued into the 1980s despite evidence that the child 
pornography industry had been virtually eradicated in the United 
States by that time. 48 The focus of fear changed back from the 
familiar to the stranger. 
The scares of the 1980s began with a 1982 incident in Bakersfield, 
California, involving married couple Alvin and Debbie McCuan. 49 
Originally charged with child endangerment after the molestation of 
their daughter by her grandfather, accusations of a child molestation 
ring soon followed. 50 Ultimately, the McCauns were found guilty, 
and each was sentenced to over one-hundred years in prison. 51 
Authorities in Kern County continued to prosecute members of "child 
sex rings" throughout the 1980s. 52 After the McCauns, allegations of 
satanic and ritual abuse began popping up around the nation. 53 The 
first traditional daycare scandal quickly followed in 1983, involving 
the McMartin preschool. 54 These cases continued through the 1995 
sex ring scandal in Wenatchee, Washington. 55 
While the scandals spread across the country and even abroad, the 
response was initially local. 56 Members of the locality investigated 
within their own community and called for immediate local reaction, 
45. Missing Children's Assistance Act, 42 v.s.c. §§5771-5780 (2006); JENKINS, supra 
note 29, at 133-34 tb1.6.1 (chronicling legislative hearings leading up to the passage 
of the Missing Children's Assistance Act). 
46. Adler, supra note 41, at 223 .... 24. 
47. See JENKINS, supra note 29, at 153-55. 
48. Adler, supra note 41, at 232-33. 
49. EDWARD HUMES, MEAN JUSTICE: A TOWN'S TERROR, A PROSECUTOR'S POWER, A 
BETRAY AL OF INNOCENCE 206 (1999). 
50. ld. at 209-11. 
51. Wrongly Convicted Database, FOREJUSTICE, http://forejustice.org/dbllocation/McCuan 
--Alvin.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2011); see also Maggie Jones, Who Was Abused?, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2004, § 6, at 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com 
12004/09/19/magazine119KlDSL.html. These sentences were overturned two years 
later. ld. 
52. See HUMES, supra note 49, at 218-19. 
53. See JENKINS, supra note 29, at 165-70. 
54. See id. at 166--67. 
55. See id. at 179-80. 
56. See id. at 167. 
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be it through governmental or social pressure (such as public 
denunciation). 57 
The current legislative framework, originating with registration and 
notification requirements, began in the 1990s and has grown 
continually since then. In the aftermath of the horrific rape and 
murder of a seven-year-old boy by a released sex offender, 
Washington State passed the first notification bill in 1990. 58 The 
statute also created residency restrictions and new standards for 
extended detention. 59 The 1993 murder of Peggy Klaas and the 1994 
murder of Megan Kanka pushed sex offender laws onto the national 
scale. 60 Seven-year-old Megan, a New Jersey child, had been raped 
and killed by a released sex offender who lived in her 
neighborhood. 61 From the outrage that followed, New Jersey passed 
"Megan's Law" in 1994.62 The U.S. Congress followed in 1996, 
requiring all states to introduce some form of notification 
procedure. 63 
B. Description a/Current Legislation 
Current legislation regarding sex offenders is both ineffective and 
counterproductive. Such statutes have not benefited public safety and 
may have actually endangered it. 64 By increasing alienation of sex 
offenders, they can also raise recidivism rates. 65 Sex offender 
regulations primarily involve registration, notification, and residency 
57. See, e.g., HUMES, supra note 49, at 219-20 (noting that suspected child molesters lost 
jobs, lives, and families whether charges were filed or not). 
58. WASHINGTON STATE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY, WASHINGTON STATE'S 
COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION LAW: 15 YEARS OF CHANGE I (2006), available at 
http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/06-02-1202.pdf;seealsoJENKlNs.supranote29.at 
191. 
59. JENKINS, supra note 29, at 191-92. 
60. Jd. at 196--97. 
61. See State v. Timmendequas, 737 A.2d 55, 65 (N.J. 1999); William Glaberson, Man at 
Heart of Megan's Law Convicted of Her Grisly Murder, N. Y. TIMES, May 31, 1997, § 
I, at I, available at http://www.nytimes.comlI997/05/311nyregionlman-at-heart-of-
megan-s-Iaw-convicted-of-her-grisly-murder.html. 
62. JENKINS, supra note 29, at 197-98; see N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to -II (West 2005). 
California passed the first registration statute in the nation in 1947. Logan, supra note 
33, at 61. 
63. Megan's Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 
l4071(d) (1994)) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.c. § 14071(e) (2006)); JENKINS, 
supra note 29, at 198. 
64. See generally Bagley, supra note 24 (delineating reasons why current legislation is 
ineffective). 
65. Jd. at 1381. 
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restrictions. 66 Under federal law, states face the loss of federal 
funding if they do not adopt registration requirements. 67 The law also 
requires some form of "notification" making the information publicly 
available. 68 
The statutory designation of "sex offender" often contains 
offenders not commonly considered an inherent danger to society. 69 
Some states make no distinction regarding the seriousness of the 
crime or the determined dangerousness of the offender. 70 Depending 
on the state, sexual offenses include possession of child pornography, 
kidnapping a minor, public exposure, computer solicitation of a 
minor, providing a child with pornography, false imprisonment of a 
minor, obscenity, or conspiring to do any of these acts.71 For 
example, the District of Columbia and twenty-nine states define 
statutory rape as a strict liability crime, but nonetheless, twenty-eight 
of these jurisdictions include it as a registerable offense. 72 
Residency restrictions are the largest growing area of law in sex 
offender regulations. 73 Although not required by federal law, twenty 
states now have some form of residency restrictions. 74 In the past 
66. ld. at 1350. "[C]ivil commitment, registration, notification, and zoning schemes[] are 
not alternatives to each other; rather, they are supplements, building an increasingly 
higher wall around sex offenders." Id. at 1354. 
67. Jacob Wetteriing Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender 
Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 2038 (1994) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.c. § 14071(g)(2)(A) (2006». 
68. 108 Stat. at 2042 (codified as amended at § 14071(e». 
69. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, No EASY ANSWERS: SEX OFFENDER LAWS IN THE US 39 
(2007). 
70. Id. at 8, 55. 
71. Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587, 
590 (2006) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 16911) (describing covered offenses); 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 314 (West 2008) (obscene conduct); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. 
LAW § 11-207 (LexisNexis 2002) (child pornography and computer solicitation); see 
also Duster, supra note 13, at 763. 
72. Carpenter, supra note 4, at 325 n.139 (noting that Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, 
District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, 
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin include statutory rape as both a strict-liability 
and a registerable offense). Twenty-one states provide some kind of defense to 
statutory rape where the defendant mistook the victim for being at least the age of 
consent. Id. at 317. 
73. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 69, at 2; Jill S. Levenson, Collateral 
Consequences of Sex Offender Residence Restrictions, 21 CRIM. JUST. STUD. 153, 153 
(2008). 
74. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 69, at 100 (including Alabama, Arkansas, 
California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
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few years, hundreds of municipalities have passed local zoning 
ordinances. 75 Depending on the locality, residency restrictions ban 
sex offenders from living within five-hundred feet to four miles from 
locations such as bus stops, childcare facilities, churches, parks, 
public swimming pools, schools, skating rinks, and video arcades. 76 
Some states include the vague "locations where children are the 
primary occupants or users,,77 and "place[s] where children regularly 
congregate.,,78 To address the problem, developers have even 
designed "sex offender-free" communities. 79 
Consequently, sex offenders have been regulated right out of town, 
as is often the explicitly stated intent of the legislature. 8o In Georgia, 
the house majority leader constructed the state residency restrictions 
to make it "[so] onerous and ... inconvenient [that] they may just 
want to move somewhere else.,,81 Many other localities have 
followed suit, afraid that displaced sex offenders will relocate to their 
districts. 82 Repeatedly, industrial areas and high-end residential 
Michigan, Mississippi, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, 
Washington, and West Virginia). 
75. See id.; Levenson, supra note 73, at 153. 
76. For state residency restrictions governing sex offenders, see ALA. CODE § 15-20-026 
(LexisNexis 200S); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-12S (2006 & Supp. 2009); CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 3003.5(b) (West 2000 & Supp. 2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 947.1405 (West 
Supp. 2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (Supp. 2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § IS-S329 
(West Supp. 200S); 720 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5111- 9.3 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 
IND. CODE ANN. § 11-13-3-4 (LexisNexis Supp. 200S); IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.2A 
(West 200S); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.545 (West Supp. 200S); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 14:91.1-2 (Supp. 2009); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 2S.735 (West Supp. 2009); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.052 (West 200S); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-25(4) (West 
Supp. 200S); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.147 (West Supp. 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2950.031 (West 200S); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 590 (West 2004 & Supp. 2009); 
OR. REv. STAT. § 144.642 (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-24B-22(l)--{4) (200S); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-211 (200S); TEX. GOv'T CODE ANN. § 50S.IS7(b) (West 
200S); VA. CODE ANN. § IS.2-370.2-3 (200S); REv. CODE WASH. § 9.94A.030(S) 
(West 200S); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-12-26(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009). 
77. See OR. REv. STAT. § 144.642 (2007). 
7S. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 947.1405 (West Supp. 2009). 
79. Emily Ramshaw, 'Sex Offender' Label Makes No Distinction: For Many Men, 
Registry Has Lasting and Devastating Effects, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Oct. 2, 
2006), available at http://www.nacdl.org/sl_docs.nsflfreeformlsex_offender009? 
OpenDocument. 
SO. See, e.g., Doe V. Miller, 29S F. Supp. 2d S44, S50 (S.D. Iowa 2004), rev'd, 405F.3d 
700 (Sth Cir. 2005) (describing how the majority of the towns in the county were 
restricted, and in some towns, "barely two percent of housing [wa]s available"). 
SI. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 69, at 100 (quoting Rep. Jerry Keen). 
S2. See id. at 2-3. 
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neighborhoods are the only places left in town. 83 Others deny sex 
offenders access to emergency shelters; in the case of a hurricane: sex 
offenders must report to the local jail. 84 
For the most part, residency laws have proven ineffective. Studies 
have not found any correlation between the presence of residency 
restrictions and lower recidivism rates. 85 Additionally, despite these 
restrictions, sex offenders continue to have access to children. 
Except in rare cases, the statutes govern where sex offenders live, not 
what spaces they otherwise inhabit. 86 Required only to occupy their 
official residence from, for example, ten in the evening until six in 
the morning,87 they can still visit bus stops, parks, and playgrounds 
throughout the day, the times when children are most likely to be 
there. 88 Usually, restrictions have no impact on access to private 
homes, where eighty-four percent of sexual assaults on children 
under twelve occur. 89 In a study conducted by Jill Levenson and Leo 
P. Cotter, sex offenders related the "chilling and ironic reality: 'You 
can live next door to a minor but not a school. ",90 One respondent 
reasoned that these limits "serve[] no purpose but to give some 
people the illusion of safety. ,,91 
More than being ineffective, these regulations can actually prove 
counterproductive. Sanctions affect daily living in a myriad of ways. 
83. See, e.g., Miller, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 851. 
84. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 69, at 103-04. In Florida, the state "directs 
registrants to report directly to prison in case ofa hurricane." ld. at 104. 
85. See, e.g., COLO. DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY, REPORT ON SAFETY ISSUES RAISED BY LIVING 
ARRANGEMENTS FOR AND LOCATION OF SEX OFFENDERS IN THE COMMUNITY 4 (2004); 
MINN. DEP'T OF CORRS., LEVEL THREE SEX OFFENDERS RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT 
ISSUES 9 (2003); WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POL'y, COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION: A 
STUDY OF OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS & RECIDIVISM 13 (1995); Duster, supra note 
13, at 752-53. 
86. See Miller, 298 F. Supp. 2d. at 849; Bagley, supra note 24, at 1379. 
87. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 69, at 103; Thompson, supra note 10. 
88. See, e.g., Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 719 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that offenders may freely 
access "areas near schools or child care facilities for employment, to conduct 
commercial transactions, or for any purpose other than establishing a residence"); 
Bagley, supra note 24, at 1379 (explaining how statutes bar sex offenders from living, 
working, or loitering in restricted zones, but they do not "completely prohibit 
registered sex offenders from being within those zones"). 
89. See BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CHILD VICTIMIZERS: VIOLENT 
OFFENDERS AND THEIR VICTIMS 12 tb1.l4 (1996) (finding that 42.9% of violent crimes 
against children happen in the victim's home and another 41.8% happen in the 
offender's home). 
90. Levenson & Cotter, supra note 25, at 175. 
91. ld. at 174 ("The majority of respondents emphatically proclaimed that the I,OOO-ft 
rule would have no effect on their risk of re[ -]offense. "). 
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These restrictions only increase the difficulty sex offenders have 
reintegrating into the community, a factor that has consistently been 
shown to reduce recidivism. 92 This includes participating in family 
and community activities, obtaining a job, and having a stable place 
to live.93 Residency restrictions interfere with the ability of sex 
offenders to live in their hometowns or even with their families. 94 
Sex offenders are often forced into rural or other inaccessible areas. 95 
Those without a finn residence may fail to register with the parole 
officer, falling off the state's radar and increasing the number of sex 
offenders deemed missing from state rolls. 96 Of the more than 
620,000 sex offenders required to register, at least 100,000 are now 
missing from the system. 97 
III. APPLICATION OF MORAL PANIC THEORY 
This essay analyzes the rising fears about sexual abuse and 
resulting legislation through the lens of Ulrich Beck's risk society.98 
Previous legal scholarship has addressed these laws as the result of a 
moral panic, or sex panic.99 This section will explain what moral 
panic is, then explore the ways in which the current anxieties over 
sex offenders are similar and dissimilar to the traditional moral panic. 
o 
A. Defining Moral Panic 
In Folk Devils & Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and 
Rockers, Stanley Cohen provides the foundation model of a moral 
pamc: 
92. See COLO. DEP'T. OF PUB. SAFETY, supra note 85, at 32; Levenson_& Cotter, supra 
note 25, at 173 (recounting research in the field and study where "many offenders 
emphasized their need for social support and believed their risk increased with 
isolation from supportive family and friends"). 
93. Levenson & Cotter, supra note 25, at 172-73. 
94. Id. ("[H]ousing restrictions increased isolation, created financial and emotional 
hardship, and led to decreased stability."). 
95. See, e.g., Doe v. Miller, 298 F. Supp. 2d 844, 851, 869 (S.D. Iowa 2004), rev'd, 405 
F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005). 
96. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 69, at 116. 
97. NAT'L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, 2008 REpORT 5 (2008); Tracking 
Team Hunts for Missing Sex Offenders, THE FRONTLINE, Winter 2007, at 4 (Nat'l Ctr. 
for Missing & Exploited Children, Alexandria, Va.). 
98. See BECK, supra note 23. 
99. See, e.g., JENKINS, supra note 29, at 6; Filler, supra note 15, at 358; Irvine, supra note 
15, at 1. 
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(i) Concern (rather than fear) about the potential or 
imagined threat; (ii) Hostility - moral outrage towards the 
actors (folk devils) who embody the problem .. , ; (iii) 
Consensus - a widespread agreement (not necessarily 
total) that the threat exists, is serious and that "something 
should be done".... (iv) Disproportionality: an 
exaggeration of the number or strength of the cases, in terms 
of the damage caused, moral offensiveness, potential risk if 
ignored. . . . (v) Volatility - the panic erupts and 
dissipates suddenly and without warning. 100 
Cohen emphasizes the last two factors: disproportionality and 
volatility. 101 David Garland includes two additional elements he sees 
as essential, yet unmentioned in Cohen's definition: "(i) the moral 
dimension of the social reaction, particularly the introspective soul-
searching that accompanies these episodes; and (ii) the idea that the 
deviant conduct in question is somehow symptomatic." 102 
Moral panics are concerned with the disintegration of society. 103 
They can involve concern over material harm-as with crime 
panics-but the focus is social dangers that create such harms. l04 A 
moral panic is the quintessential witch-hunt, such as the actual Salem 
Witch Trials or the red scares of the McCarthy era. 105 In modem 
times, panic discourses have developed around such issues as child 
pornography, internet predators, and welfare fraud. 106 Individual 
problems are "discovered" and elevated into wide-scale evils. 107 A 
moral panic centers on a specific group viewed as threatening those 
around them; 108 without action, they risk destroying society as a 
100. COHEN, supra note 16, at xxii. 
101. Id. 
102. David Garland, On the Concept of Moral Panic, 4 CRIME, MEDIA, CULTURE, 9, II 
(2008). 
103. See id. 
104. See id. at 13. 
105. See ERICH GOODE & NACHMAN BEN-YEHUDA, MORAL PANICS: THE SOCIAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF DEVIANCE 56 (2d ed. 2009) (iikening the Salem Witch Trials to 
moral panic); Jeffrey S. Victor, Moral Panics and the Social Construction of Deviant 
Behavior: A Theory and Application to the Case of Ritual Child Abuse, 41 SOC. 
PERSP. 541, 541-42 (1998) (identifying "Red Scares" as an example of moral panic). 
106. See generally JENKINS, supra note 29, at 145-63 (discussing child pornography); 
Justine Cassell & Meg Cramer, High Tech or High Risk: Moral Panics About Girls 
Online, in DIGITAL YOUTH, INNOVATION, AND THE UNEXPECTED (Tara McPherson, ed., 
2008) (internet predators); Benjamin Shepard, Sex Panic and the Welfare State, 34 J. 
Soc. & Soc. WELFARE 155-60 (2007) (welfare fraud). 
107. See GoODE & BEN-YEHUDA, supra note 105, at 154-55. 
108. See id. at 35. 
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whole. lo9 For its own survival, the community must unite to find the 
contamination and purge it from its midst. 
A moral panic centers around one specific group: the oft-described 
"folk devil."llo Folk devils, the cause of the panic, "are inherently 
deviant and are presumed to be self-seeking, out of control and in 
danger of undermining the stability of society."'" A moral panic 
cannot exist without a focus to be frightened about, a place for 
passions to converge: "[N]ot only must the condition, phenomenon, 
or behavior [be] seen as threatening, but a clearly identifiable group 
in[,] or segment ofT,] the society must be seen as responsible for the 
threat."ll2 As an identifiable group, their "visibility is the basis of ... 
expurgation."ll3 The danger is contained within them-and 
consequently is the group against whom to act, the persons to fear. 114 
Disproportionality is essential to classifying a specific episode or 
set of expressed concerns as a moral panic. 115 The alarm is often 
misdirected, expanding in one area, while other threats are 
downplayed. 116 As Cohen notes, there is no exact way to measure 
when the reaction to a specific risk is overstated. 117 Nonetheless, in a 
situation such as the sex offender scares, the accumulated evidence 
can point to a general estimation of risk. 118 The rhetoric of the moral 
panic, as shown through the media and sources like legislative 
109. See id. 
110. See, e.g., Christie Barron & Dany Lacombe, Moral Panic and the Nasty Girl, 42 CAN. 
REV. SOC. & ANTHROPOLOGY 51, 53 (2005) ("All moral panics identify and denounce 
a personal agent responsible for the condition that is generating widespread public 
concern."). 
111. BERNARD SCHISSEL, BLAMING CHILDREN: YOUTH CRIME, MORAL PANICS AND THE 
POLITICS OF HATE 30 (1997). 
112. See GOODE & BEN-YEHUDA,supra note 105, at 38. 
113. See Ungar, supra note 19, at 283-84. 
114. See GOODE & BEN-YEHUDA, supra note 105, at 35. 
115. See id. at 37,40. 
116. See id. at 44-46. 
117. See COHEN, supra note 16, at xxviii-xxix. 
118. See Meaghan Kelly, Lock Them Up - and Throw Away the Key: The Preventive 
Detention of Sex Offenders in the United States and Germany, 39 GEO. J. INT'L L. 551, 
552 (2007) (discussing the relationship between media portrayal of sex offenders and 
the public'S perception of risk); see also Emily Horowitz, Growing Media and Legal 
Attention to Sex Offenders: More Safety or More Injustice?, 7 J. INST. JUST. & INT'L 
STUD. 143, 146 (2007) (discussing how media coverage of sexual offenses against 
children prompts public fear and panic). 
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history, allows for an analysis of proportionality when compared with 
other statistics. 119 
Finally, moral panics are volatile: an eruption of passion and fear 
that jumps out and eventually subsides. 120 While it may ebb and 
flow, ultimately a panic is temporally bound. 
B. Sex Offender Scares as a Moral Panic 
Previous legal scholarship has analyzed sex offender statutes as the 
manifestation of a moral panic. 121 This period of anxiety meets most 
of Cohen's factors for a moral panic: concern, hostility, consensus, 
and disproportionality.122 Anxiety over child sexual abuse and the 
inability to protect children from harm is a salient fear in present 
society.123 Despite other, more probable dangers, these issues remain 
a large concern. Moreover, they are an agreed upon social harm. 
Child sexual abuse is decried unanimously as a moral wrong and a 
violation of social norms. 124 Garland warns against the dangers of 
anthropomorphizing "society" into a monolithic mass that can share a 
single viewpoint. 125 In these circumstances, however, there is scarce 
disagreement. Clear consensus exists as to the serious injury 
caused. 126 Legislators, in particular, have felt the push to support sex 
offender statutes and show their "hard stance" against se'xual 
abuse. 127 Politically, to oppose such statutes would be seen as 
backing sexual abuse and would mean certain death in the polls. 128 
In tum, this concern generates great hostility. Sexual abuse is a 
widespread social harm that must be battled. Nonetheless, there has 
been too little analysis of the systemic issues involved: what leads to 
sexual abuse, what leads to it being ignored, and thus, what has 
119. See Horowitz, supra note 118, at 144, 146-47, 151 (discussing a statistical analysis of 
media coverage concerning sex offenders and sex offenses). 
120. COHEN, supra note 16, at xxx. As Cohen describes it, panic "is self-limiting, 
temporary and spasmodic, a splutter of rage which bums itself out." ld. 
121. See Horowitz, supra note 118, at 143,144,155; Kelly, supra note 118, at 553. 
122. See supra Parts ILA-B. 
123. See JENIONS, supra note 29, at 1-2; Garland, supra note 102, at 15; Horowitz, supra 
note 118, at 143-44. 
124. See Nancy Fischer, Oedipus Wrecked? The Moral Boundaries of Incest, 17 GENDER & 
SOC'y 92, 107 (2003); Matthew Kieran, The Thrill and Repulsion of the Morally 
Prohibited, 64 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL REs. 31, 41-43 (2002); Donald Levy, 
Perversion and the Unnatural as Moral Categories, 90 ETHICS 191, 191 (1980). 
125. See Garland, supra note 102, at 23. 
126. See JENIONS, supra note 29, at 1-2; see also Kelly, supra note 118, at 551, 555. 
127. See Horowitz, supra note 118, at 143,148-50,156. 
128. See JENKINS, supra note 29, at 198 (discussing the political economy); Filler, supra 
note 15, at 362-63; Horowitz, supra note 118, at 143, 155-56. 
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allowed it to continue. 129 Instead, the anger is focused on a specific 
set of actors out of proportion to the actual hann they cause. 130 
The clearest similarity is the presence of the folk devil, the focus of 
society's hostility: released sex offenders living secretly in the 
unknowing community and destined to offend again. 13l In particular, 
many see stranger offenders as the root of all injury and the focus of 
all blame. While family and friends commit ninety percent of child 
sexual abuse, the anxiety is not directed at this potentially nebulous 
group. 132 Statistically, a child is safer on the street than at horne, 
particularly when young. 133 Nonetheless, the most vivid fear is that 
of children abducted, raped, and murdered, all by outsiders. The 
danger is personified in the stranger offender, the man lurking on the 
street, unable to control his desires, waiting for the unsuspecting 
child. 
The risk is not diffused and free fonn, like the intangible, scientific 
issues dealt with in risk society. 134 Anyone can identify the 
individuals in question. They can be delineated and legislated 
against. The very nature of the laws indicates the clear target: It 
exists within those required to be registered and bound by the 
subsequent requirements. 135 These dangers are in striking contrast to 
risk society anxieties, which are more likely to deal with an 
intangible scientific issue or an ecological disaster. 136 Here, the acts 
of hann are clear, the hann caused is clear, and the anticipated 
perpetrators are clear. 
C. Dissimilarities to a Moral Panic 
Nonetheless, a moral panic account is insufficient to explain all. 
Unlike a traditional moral panic, anxiety about sexual abuse and sex 
offenders has been a constant in American culture for decades. 137 
While there have been peaks of anxiety, public anxieties about sexual 
129. See Regina Jones Johnson, Advances in Understanding and Treating Childhood 
Sexual Abuse: Implications for Research and Policy, 31 FAM. & COMMUNITY HEALTH 
S24, S24 (2008), available at http://www.nursingcenter.com/pdf.asp?AID=763931. 
130. See U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, NAT'L CTR. FOR PTSD, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 
(2007), http://www.ptsd.va.gov/pub1ic/pages/chi1d-sexua1-abuse.asp. 
131. See Barron & Lacombe, supra note 110, at 53. 
132. See U.S. DEP'TOF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 130. 
133. See BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., supra note 89, at 12 tb1.l4. 
134. See discussion infra Part lILA. 
135. See Ungar, supra note 19, at 283-84. 
136. See infra Part lILA. 
137. See discussion supra Part LA. 
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abuse have persisted since the 1970s, even as the exact subjects have 
changed. 138 
In a moral panic, while the same subject can cause more than one 
interval of moral panic, generally each episode has a start date and a 
finish date. 139 To the extent that one could delineate a period of 
panic, the 1970s serve as a starting point for the current 
preoccupation with sex offender dangers. 140 Since then, there has 
been some form of sex panic, even though the targets have varied. 141 
Child sexual abuse has remained a key public concern and prime 
media topic. 142 While discussions and statutes point to specific 
events, the general movement does not derive from definite 
moments. 143 Instead, there has been a continuous process of anxiety 
for decades; the only current change is the role of the state. 144 
The reaction also differs from a traditional moral panic. 145 Sex 
offender statutes and criminal registration laws have been in place 
since the 1930s. 146 Over the years, the level of ~ontrol has grown and 
intensified, developing at a national and local level. 147 Registration 
requirements have increased, morphing into notification and 
residency restrictions. 148 The web of legislation creates a status that 
permanently determines what a sex offender can do, where he can 
live, even which physical spaces he can occupy. 149 Growing 
regulations increase governmental intrusion into the minutia of daily 
life. 
Crucially, opinions of these statutes have changed as well. With 
the development of the risk society, views of registration statutes and 
other status regulations have become more positive. 150 There is 
138. See discussion supra Part LA. 
139. See Ungar, supra note 19, at 272. 
140. See Adler, supra note 41, at 211-12, 218; supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text. 
141. See supra text accompanying notes 45-62. 
142. See Adler, supra note 41, at 215-18 (explaining that beginning in the 1990s, the child 
abuse crisis became a recurring topic in movies, political debates, and television talk 
shows). Even celebrities such as Oprah Winfrey, Roseanne Barr, and Suzanne 
Somers have revealed that they were sexually molested as children. ld. 
143. See Adler, supra note 41, at 226-29 (discussing statutes enacted in response to 
particular events). 
144. See id. at 223-26 (describing decades of anxiety); infra text accompanying notes 230-
36,258-63 (discussing the role of the state). 
145. See supra text accompanying notes 212-28. 
146. See JENKINS, supra note 29, at 80; supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text. 
147. See supra text accompanying notes 64-68; infra text accompanying notes 255-57, 
263. 
148. See supra notes 66-84 and accompanying text. 
149. See Duster, supra note 13, at 717-18. 
150. See infra notes 250-63 and accompanying text. 
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increasing acceptance of these state intrusions. 151 The United States 
Supreme Court first addressed criminal registration statutes in 1957. 
In Lambert v. California, the Court held that the Los Angeles felony 
registration did not provide sufficient notice and violated due 
process. 152 The statute was considered particularly egregious because 
"[v Jiolation of its provisions is unaccompanied by any activity 
whatever, mere presence in the city being the test." 153 Quoting Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, the Court felt that a "'law which punished conduct 
which would not be blameworthy in the average member of the 
community would be too severe for that community to bear. '" 154 
Now, Lambert is "an isolated deviation from the strong current of 
precedents-a derelict on the waters of the law.,,15s Status 
regulations are unproblematic; they are widely regarded as reasonable 
obligations that greatly benefit the community instead of burdening 
it. 156 Because of their condition, like "[0 Jwners of firearms, doctors 
who prescribe narcotics, and purchasers of dyed diesel," sex 
offenders are responsible for consequences of their actions. 157 A 
sexual offender "'removed himself from the class of ordinary 
citizens' to the point 'that cannot reasonably expect to be free from 
regulation. ,,, I S8 
IV. MORAL PANIC IN THE RISK SOCIETY 
While similarities to a moral panic exist, the traditional moral panic 
paradigm does not hold. This is moral panic developed in a risk 
society. As Sean P. Hier writes, "the emergence of the risk society 
presents fertile ground for moral panics." 159 Surrounded by 
15l. See infra notes 250-57 and accompanying text. 
152. 355 U.S. 225, 228-30 (1957). 
153. Id. at 229. 
154. Id. (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 50 (1909)). 
155. Texaco v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 537 n.33 (1982) (quoting Lambert v. California, 355 
U.S. 225, 232 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). 
156. See, e.g., Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("[R]egistration does 
not impose a substantial affirmative disability or restraint."). 
157. United States v. Lovejoy, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1032,1037 (D.N.D. 2007) (quoting United 
States v. Roberts, No. 6:07-CR-70031, 2007 WL 2155750, at *2 (W.D. Va. July 27, 
2007)). 
158. United States v. Hinen, 487 F. Supp. 2d 747, 754 (W.D. Va. 2007) (quoting United 
States v. Bostic, 168 F.3d 718, 722 (4th Cir. 1999)). 
159. Hier, supra note 21, at 5. Hier predicts that "as anxieties endemic to the risk society 
converge with anxieties contained at the level of community, we should expect a 
proliferation of moral panics as an ordering practice in late modernity." Id. at 19 
(emphasis omitted). 
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uncontrollable and unquantifiable fears, crime, in particular, is a 
concrete danger against which to rally.160 The menace is contained 
within a clearly ascertainable group and provides a focus to relieve 
general anxiety. 161 This section will explain what the risk society is 
and then explore the way that moral panic interacts with and is 
transfonned by the risk society. 
A. Defining Risk Society 
The risk society is a period in late modernity where anxiety over 
manufactured material risks overwhelms other worries, creating a 
world fraught with "[u]ncertainty and unpredictability.,,162 The 
global risk society is "a phase of development of modem society in 
which the social, political, ecological and individual risks created by 
the momentum of innovation increasingly elude the control and 
protective institutions of industrial society.,,163 According to Ulrich 
Beck, "[t]he entry into risk society occurs at the moment when the 
hazards which are now decided and consequently produced by 
society undennine and/or cancel the established safety systems of the 
provident state's existing risk ca1culations.,,164 In contrast to a moral 
panic, the concerns are: "1) very complex in terms of causation; 2) 
unpredictable and latent; 3) not limited by time, space, or social class 
(i.e., globalized); 4) not detectable by our physical senses; and 5) are 
the result of human decisions.,,165 
The risk society is a world filled with intangible, indefinable risks. 
Beck describes it as a period where concerns over managing risk 
supplant worries over managing goods. 166 In the current phase of 
reflective, or advanced, modernity, "the social production of wealth is 
systematically accompanied by the social production of risks.,,167 
Current preoccupations have turned from issues of subsistence to 
controlling the unknown dangers that surround us, at least in 
wealthier parts of the world. 168 Beck frames the paradigm issue as 
"[h]ow can the risks and hazards systematically produced as part of 
160. See Poirier, supra note 20, at 428-29; Ungar, supra note 19, at 275. 
161. See infra text accompanying notes 218-30. 
162. Ungar, supra note 19, at 282. 
163. ULRICH BECK, WORLD RISK SOCIETY 72 (1999). 
164. Ulrich Beck, Risk Society & the Provident State, in RISK, ENVIRONMENT & 
MODERNITY: TOWARDS A NEW ECOLOGY 31 (Scott Lash, et al. eds., Martin Chalmers, 
trans., 1992) (emphasis omitted). 
165. Ungar, supra note 19, at 273. 
166. See Beck, supra note 23, at 19-20. 
167. ld. at 19 (emphasis omitted). 
168. See id. 
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modernization be prevented, minimized, dramatized, or 
channeled?" 169 These feelings change the way people interact with 
the world around them. Under a risk society, "riskthinking has 
become not only pervasive but also routinised [sic]: it is part of the 
everyday thinking processes of individuals in their private and 
organisational [sic] lives.,,17o Created from anxiety, risk-thinking 
perpetuates anxiety in its stead. 171 
Ecological dangers and disasters are emblematic of risk society 
concerns.172 Discussions of the hazards of modem life are rift with 
concerns over the harm the environment can do to its population. 173 
These anxieties manifest themselves in issues as diverse as the 
dangers of nuclear reactors to worries over rising coastlines. The 
consumption of mercury provides one discursive example. 174 Due to 
ecological contamination, some animals have rising levels of 
mercury.175 Discussions have centered on fish as the point in the 
cycle where humans are most likely to ingest mercury. 176 Pregnant 
women are considered particularly vulnerable, with an unquantifiable 
threat for their incipient child.177 The risk of mercury, however, is 
intangible. We know it is there, but we cannot see it. There is no 
identifiable evildoer. Moreover, while we may have an intellectual 
notion that the fish before us may cause harm, there is no way to 
169. Jd. 
170. BARBARA HUDSON, JUSTICE IN THE RISK SOCIETY: CHALLENGING AND RE-AFFIRMING 
JUSTICE IN LATE MODERNITY 43-44 (2003). 
171. See Beck, supra note 23 at 20. 
172. Ulrich Beck, Politics of Risk Society, in THE POLITICS OF RISK SOCIETY 10 (Jane 
Franklin ed., 1998) ("Risk society begins where nature ends .. " This is where we 
switch the focus of our anxieties from what nature can do to us to what we have done 
to nature."). 
173. See generally Beck, supra note 164, at 27,32-33. Beck explains that, "[i]n contrast to 
early industrial risks, nuclear, chemical, ecological and genetic engineering risks (a) 
can be limited in terms of neither time nor place, (b) are not accountable according to 
the established rules of causality, blame and liability, and (c) cannot be compensated 
or insured against." Id. at 31. 
174. See, e.g., David N. Pellow, Social Inequalities and Environmental Conflict, 25 
HORIZONTES ANTROPOL6GICOS, 15, 22-23 (2006), available at http://www.scielo.br 
Ipdf/ha/v 12n25/a02v 1225.pdf (discussing anxieties surrounding mercury poisoning). 
175. EPA, EPA-4521R-97-005, MERCURY STUDY REpORT TO CONGRESS, VOLUME III: FATE 
AND TRANSPORT OF MERCURY IN THE ENVIRONMENT 7-1 (1997), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/oarpglt3/reports/volume3.pdf. 
176. See id. at 2-12 to 2-14. 
177. See Dariush Mozaffarian, MD, DrPH, & Eric B. Rimm, ScD, Fish Intake, 
Contaminants, and Human Health Evaluating the Risks and the Benefits, 12 J. AM. 
MED. ASS'N 1885, 1889-90 (2006), available at http://jama.ama-assn.orglcgi/ 
reprint/29611511885. 
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verify that feeling. Furthermore, we have knowledge that damage 
may have already occurred, but again, we have no way to confirm 
that or to ascertain the extent of any potential harm. 
Unlike a moral panic, there is no specific group to hold directly 
responsible. Mercury poisoning can come from many different 
locations. 178 At most, there is a nebulous notion of "industry" as the 
cause of harm, at times with particular corporations to point to as the 
polluters. The chemical surrounds us, the potential for ingestion is 
heavy in the foods we eat. 179 There is no way for the average person 
to track one specific strain, let alone a specific fish. ISO Consequently, 
there is no easy way to address the problem, at least not at a local 
level. 
In the risk society, scientists and other experts arbitrate the 
omnipresent threats, foreclosing the ability for the nonprofessional to 
control and manage their own dangers. 181 The extent of the harm, the 
causes of the harm, the duration of the harm, even the starting point 
of the harm, all remain outside of lay comprehension. ls2 The public 
is forced to rely on scientific actors for interpretation-but often does 
not have faith in the answers because of competing claims and the 
inability to verify independently.ls3 
While a moral panic has a concrete focus of blame, within risk 
societies, the dangers are uncontrollable and even unknowable. ls4 
They are omnipresent, but remain ethereal. Often, "the violators are 
more institutionally-based and somewhat invisible .... [T]heir 
routine rather than deviant actions ... underlie the problem."ls5 In 
contrast, an identifiable object is essential in a traditional moral 
178. EPA, supra note 175, at 7-1. 
179. See id. 
180. See Mozaffarian & Rimm, supra note 177, at 1889. 
181. See, e.g., Ungar, supra note 19, at 277 ("With the risk society, issues tend to be 
warranted more by scientific findings or claims, with scientists, for all their public 
liabilities, playing a central role in the cast of claims makers."). 
182. See Beck, supra note 164, at 29-30 ("[T]he relationship of society to the hazards and 
problems produced by it ... exceed the bases a/societal conceptions a/security."). 
183. HUDSON, supra note 170, at 44 ("The distance from nature which is the situation of 
the citizens of modernity necessitates an ever-increasing dependency on expert 
knowledge, but at the same time the critical reflexivity of modernity's mentalities 
means that confidence in such knowledge tends to decline rather than increase."); 
Poirier, supra note 20, at 429 {"Because the risks are difficult or impossible for the 
average citizen (or perhaps for anyone at all) to appreciate, we live in a state of 
constant apprehension about them."). 
184. See Ungar, supra note 19, at 273, 276, 282. 
185. Id. at 284. 
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panic. 186 A population is galvanized under one banner with the 
impetus of a focused enemy. A witch-hunt requires witches. A 
moral panic is right there, moved forward by popular appeal, carried 
along by your neighbors. Here, however, there is no person directly 
in front of you. There is no way to grasp easily the risks by reference 
to what you can see and hold. Instead, we turn to experts to layout 
the dangers, through scientific claims that are often in dispute. 187 
Nonetheless, it is not only that risk society fears focus on more 
complex, intangible problems; many issues are complex. In contrast 
to a moral panic, however, fears focus on material harm: the danger 
to one's environment, but ultimately to one's own bodily integrity. 188 
The fear is not corruption of the soul, but of the lungs or the liver. 
The harm is ultimately individual. While all the community shares 
the cancer of sexual abuse-though the direct victims feel such harm 
most acutely-mercury poisoning is an individual injury, distinct 
from what may happen to others in society. 189 It is not a rot in the 
fabric of society. 
Ultimately, humans control human-created risks, even if in a 
mediated way. Again, pollution provides an example. The risk, 
intangible as it is, is a manufactured harm.190 The average person 
cannot measure the amount of carbon particles in the air on a given 
day (leaving experts the only sufficiently capable parties in this 
scenario). 191 Nonetheless, we can identify coal companies as 
producers of harmful carbons, even if we still need scientists to 
explain the process. 192 Once defined by science, an impression is 
created that science can also control the risk. 
186. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of the folk 
devil as a group society identifies to fear). 
187. See Adler, supra note 41, at 219. 
188. See, e.g., Ungar, supra note 19, at 273-74 (discussing an outbreak of E. coli as an 
example of a risk society disaster). 
189. See supra notes 174-77 and accompanying text. 
190. See, e.g., Jeannette M. Trauth, A Case Study of Health Risk Communication: What the 
Public Wants and What It Gets, 2 RISK 49, 49-51 (1994) (examining the health 
effects of air pollution caused by steel manufacturing). 
191. See Sarah Jovan & Bruce McCune, Air-Quality Bioindication in the Greater Central 
Valley of California, with Epiphytic Macrolichen Communities, IS ECOLOGICAL 
ApPLICATIONS 1712, 1715 (2005) (describing scientific methods of collecting and 
analyzing air pollution data). 
192. See Trauth, supra note 190, at 59-60 (noting residents' ability to identify the source of 
air pollution and their reliance on experts for information concerning the associated 
health risks). 
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Under a risk society, moreover, risks are perpetual, with no way to 
distinguish beginning or end. 193 Sheldon Ungar describes the 
phenomenon as "a stream of emergencies and would-be 
emergencies." 194 There is a flow of specific incidents, but with 
perpetual undercurrents, "a vast number of relatively unfamiliar 
threats, with new threats always lurking in the background." 195 A risk 
society is a perpetual state, while a panic is a flare-up within an 
enduring backdrop. 196 
B. Moral Panic Used to Dispel Anxiety in Risk Society 
As Sheldon Ungar notes, "Uncertainty and unpredictability are at 
the core of the risk society.,,197 People become overwhelmed with 
increasing industrial threats they are unable to control or even 
comprehend. 198 Fears about basic subsistence have turned into 
anxieties about uncontrollable risks. The world transforms into one 
increasingly governed by scientists and corporations. 199 More 
knowledgeable others mediate society's hopes and fears. 200 It 
becomes difficult even to identify the fears about which to be most 
anxious. The change is in the type of risk and the perception of risk. 
There is no truly objective way to measure risk. 201 To the extent that 
risk is considered the danger of negative acts-we rarely talk about 
the "risk" of a positive event occurring-the impact is subjective. 202 
Risk is perceived. We can make calculations of how likely an event 
is to occur. 203 The risk, nonetheless, is relative. All risk is perceived, 
and thus inherently managed. 
Within this anxiety, regulation of crime becomes a tangible way to 
manage risk and quell fears. 204 Surrounded by unmanageable, 
unquantifiable fears, crime is concrete. Sheldon Ungar posits that 
"fear of crime may be a relatively reassuring site for displacing the 
193. See Ungar, supra note 19, at 276. 
194. Id. 
195. !d. 
196. See id. 
197. ld. at 282. 
198. See BECK, supra note 23, at 27. 
199. ULRICH BECK, WORLD AT RISK 6 (Ciaran Cronin, trans., 2007). 
200. See generally Lennart Sjoberg, The Allegedly Simple Structure of Experts' Risk 
Perception: An Urban Legend in Risk Research, 27 SCI., TECH., & HUM. V ALVES 443 
(2002) (noting the role of the expert in risk perception). 
201. See BECK, supra note 199, at 13. 
202. See Kathleen J. Tierney, Toward a Critical Sociology of Risk, 14 SOC. FORUM 215, 
218 (1999). 
203. See BECK, supra note 199, at 11. 
204. See Hollway & Jefferson, supra note 22, at 260. 
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more uncertain and uncontrollable anxieties of a risk society. ,,205 An 
eternal fear of the other can be projected onto persons accused of a 
specific crime, recreating a traditional moral panic. 206 Moral panic 
serves as a release, allowing the community to choose and ostracize a 
particular group to quell anxiety about those who remain. 207 Crime is 
a risk that is "knowable, decisionable (actionable), and potentially 
controllable.,,208 In this "age of uncertainly," particularly compelling 
are "discourses that appear to promise a resolution to ambivalence by 
producing identifiable victims and blameable [sic] villains."209 
One of the key elements of the moral panic is disproportionality.210 
The envisioned harm is greater than the underlying acts.211 
Correspondingly, the resulting fears are . also of a greater 
magnitude. 212 In a risk society, the response is not necessarily out of 
proportion to the underlying acts.213 In fact, the response might be 
subdued in contrast to the potential for harm. 214 While subject to 
debate, there are strong arguments that political mobilization to 
protect the environment is minuscule in comparison to the threats 
facing humanity.215 This energy and mobilization is channeled 
instead into fears over rising crime rates, a more viscerally more 
urgent and evocative call than that of rising coastlines. 216 
In a risk society, the response sought and the ability to act are both 
greater. 217 The role of the state in punishment intensifies. 2I8 Acting 
alone, an individual or community organization cannot address the 
typical inherent risk. Action requires participation of the state or 
other groups with the ability to form national and local 
205. Ungar, supra note 19, at 275. 
206. See Hollway & Jefferson, supra note 22, at 260. 
207. See id. 
208. ld. at 265. 
209. ld.; see also Hier, supra note 21, at 17 ("[P]eople will invariably be drawn to practices 
and discourses that offer the promise of social order and social control in the face of 
existential uncertainties."). 
210. Ungar, supra note 19, at 284. 
21l. See id. at 284-85. 
212. See id. 
213. See id. at 285-87. 
214. See id. 
215. See id. 
216. See id. 
217. See generally HUDSON, supra note 170 (explaining that people expect a greater 
response when the justice system allows criminals to be removed from society). 
218. See JENKINS, supra note 29, at 236; MILLER, supra note 34, at xvii, 76. 
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partnerships. 219 There is an increasing call for government 
participation, particularly at the federal level. 220 
More so than previous moral panics, these current panics have 
contained both a regional and national level. During former "sex 
panics," the public primarily called upon local police enforcement, 
not federal legislation. 221 In the 1950s, for example, in response to 
rising fears over child sexual abuse and other perceived threats to the 
nuclear family, the police were urged and supported in raids against 
"pedophiles,"-who mainly consisted of any patrons found at the 
local gay bar. 222 The danger was dealt with by immediate action 
against those identified as threateningly deviant. Persons in the 
community were able to observe directly that such individuals were 
detained and punished. 223 Similarly, albeit perhaps with a greater 
national fervor, during the daycare scares of the 1980s, members of 
the public themselves, assisted by the police system, tracked down 
violators. 224 While the anxiety turned national, for the most part, the 
response was local. 225 Members of society investigated those within 
their own community and called for quick response, be it through 
government or social pressure (such as public denunciation). 226 The 
panic was intense and furious, and so was the demanded response. 
The affected populations did not call for federal legislation or other 
national government surveillance.227 To the extent that the scares 
played themselves out locally, they dissipated as the potential targets 
were identified and isolated. 228 
Initially, incidents such as the murder of Megan Kanka or Jessica 
Lunsford were local events, all more horrifying to their communities 
because the murders were committed by persons among them. 229 
Given the reach of national news, however, the stories were quickly 
219. See MILLER, supra note 34, at 288-89. 
220. See id.; see also JENKINS, supra note 29, at 216-20. 
221. See MILLER, supra note 34, at 78, 220. 
222. See id. at 137,290-91. 
223. See id. at 80. 
224. See JOHN CREWDSON, By SILENCE BETRAYED: SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN IN 
AMERICA 139,238-39 (1988); JENKINS, supra note 29, at 141,238. 
225. See CREWDSON, supra note 224, at 141,237. 
226. See MILLER, supra note 34, at 84-85. 
227. See id.; see also CREWDSON, supra note 224, at 237. 
228. See JENKINS, supra note 29, at 220-21; MILLER, supra note 34, at 193. 
229. See State v. Timmendequas, 737 A.2d 55, 66 (N.J. 1999) (stating that a neighbor who 
lived across the street from Megan's home murdered her); Couey Guilty of Murdering 
9-year-old Jessica Lunsford, CNN (Mar. 8, 2007), http://www.cnn.coml2007/LAW/ 
03/07/girl.slainlindex.html (stating that a neighbor who lived about 150 yards from 
Jessica's home murdered her). 
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repeated throughout the country. 230 More than that, however, these 
deaths became rallying points for state and national movements. 231 
On this larger scale, the participants no longer looked to the local 
police to nose out the man next door. Now they called upon the 
federal government to address the problem. 232 
C. Impact of Risk Society on this Panic 
The switch is more than mere scale; many things have moved from 
local to national or global simply because of the realities of current 
life. The crucial change, however, is from looking for visible folk 
devils to addressing the problem as a risk that can be precisely 
controlled. 233 As a result of these forces, the concerns of a risk 
society can sustain a set of moral panic that might otherwise 
subside. 234 More than that, however, a risk society transfonns the 
nature of the moral panic. 235 In addition to prolonging the period of 
panic, the approach to addressing society's demons also changes. 
Crime used to be considered the result of human passions. Now, 
criminal impulses are seen as a quantifiable passion, which can be 
controlled down to a scientific risk. 236 The discourse changes from 
guilt to risk, looking to control future events--directing possibility, 
not just history. Consequently, the role of the government also 
changes, increasing state intervention at all levels. 237 
In a moral panic, the community defines the outsider, closing the 
gates and casting out the deviant. 238 In a risk society, however, the 
230. See Frank Langfitt, Notification of Location of Sex Offenders Sought, BALT. SUN, Mar. 
1, 1995, at B I, available at http://articles.baltimoresun.comlI995-03-
o lInewsll995060044 _1_ community-notification-offender-moves-new-jersey; Chris 
Hawke, 'Jessica's Law' Eyes Sex Offenders, CBS NEWS (Mar. 31, 2005), 
http://www.cbsnews.comlstories/2005/03/3 I/earlyshow/main684190.shtml. 
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1994, at Bl, available at http://www.nytimes.comfI994/08/04/nyregionlnew-Iaw-is-
urged-on-freed-sex-offenders.html?ref=megan _ kanka&pagewanted= I; Judge 
Sentences John Couey to Death for Murdering Jessica Lunsford, FOXNEWS (Aug. 24, 
2007), http://www.foxnews.comfstory/0.2933.294371.00.html. 
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http://www.cnn.comlUS/9606/22/clinton.radio/index.html. 
233. See Hier, supra note 21, at 5-6; Ungar, supra note 19, at 277. 
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235. See id. at 7; Ungar, supra note 19, at 281-82. 
236. See Eric S. Janus, The Preventive State, Terrorists and Sexual Predators: Countering 
the Threat ofa New Outsider Jurisprudence, 40 CRIM. L. BULL. 576, 591-94 (2004). 
237. See id. at 596. 
238. See, e.g., Barron & Lacombe, supra note 110, at 53 (discussing the "Nasty Girl" as a 
folk devil). 
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gaze turns greater: Both the cause and the solution are seen as bigger. 
The discourse goes from guilt to risk. 239 The control changes from 
immediate to wide arching and omnipresent, from the past and 
present to the future. 24o Guilt looks back, finding the offenders and 
casting them out for their past acts and harm to the community. 241 
Risk looks forward, with the expectation of dictating that which has 
not happened yet. 242 Moreover, there is a belief that the government 
can and should act to protect its populace against these dangers. 243 
The language of risk allows targeting for future harms. 244 It 
justifies increased surveillance and greater government intervention 
in the minutia of people's lives. Eric S. Janus warns that the "move 
from guilt to risk removes key constraints on the state's ability to 
limit liberty.,,245 In his words, "[t]he more distant the 'risk' is from 
actual crime, the broader must be the gaze of the government.,,246 
Additionally, in this process, society is "becoming 'markedly less 
concerned with responsibility, fault, moral sensibility' and more 
concerned with 'techniques to identify, classify, and manage 
groupings sorted by dangerousness. ",247 The response is to tum to 
the government, using heavy restraint and regulation. 
The focus turns to danger assessment and corresponding constraint. 
The law no longer merely acts on crime after it occurs, but works to 
stop it before it exists. 248 The laws plan for the future instead of 
punishing for the past. 249 There is a feeling that the state can and 
should control all threats. 250 Risk society "is a society increasingly 
preoccupied with the future (and also with safety).,,251 Consequently, 
energy focuses on "bringing possible future undesired events into 
calculations in the present, making their avoidance the central object 
of decision-making processes, and administering individuals, 
institutions, expertise, and resources in the service of that 
239. See Janus, supra note 236, at 595 ("The predator template threatens the traditional 
liberty/security balance by transitioning from 'guilt' to 'risk' as the key predicate for 
liberty deprivation."). 
240. Id. 
241. See id. at 593. 
242. See id. 
243. See id. at 581-82. 
244. See id. at 580-81. 
245. Id. at 596. 
246. Id. 
247. Id. (quoting Feeley & Simon, supra note 22, at 452). 
248. Id. at 578. 
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ambition. ,,252 More than avoidance of risk, elimination of risk is the 
goal. It is no longer permissible to have any potential dangers; 
resources are galvanized to stop the chance of even the 
infinitesimally small chance of harm. 253 This is seen as both possible 
and laudatory. 254 
The burgeoning use of sex offender statutes indicates this belief in 
calculable results. These laws plan for the future instead of punishing 
violators for past acts.255 The force of the state serves to isolate and 
act upon a certain group of people as a way to contain any threats. 256 
While one of the premises of the laws is that these acts are conducted 
by people, who, unlike technology, cannot be finely tuned, sexual 
predator laws increasingly try to manage the most minute of 
hazards. 257 
Earlier responses to sexual abuse scares were less centered on state 
involvement. 258 In the daycare scares of the 1980s, for example, 
legislation was not involved.259 The panic blazed through the public, 
spreading through community organizing and the media. Law 
enforcement was enlisted next, resulting in arrests and subsequent 
public trials. The enforcement power of the state played a role only 
to the extent of enforcing existing criminal statutes. 260 The 
community responded to the parties directly before them. 261 The 
moral panic continued into the "foraging process" for folk devils, 
searching out an ever-expanding circle of perpetrators. In this 
context, however, the public did not tum to the legislative branch en 
masse. The power of the local state was called in to act on the parties 
before them. 262 
252. See Nikolas Rose, Government and Control, 40 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 321, 332 
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In contrast, the current period of legislation focuses on total control 
enforced through state power. 263 In particular, the present "sex 
panic" focuses on the ability to restrain future harm, such that the 
danger itself is reduced to zero. This movement requires an 
underlying belief that future perils can be managed to such a great 
extent that they can be eliminated. The danger is seen as a risk 
society threat that can be precisely dissected and acted upon. The 
notion of the "moral monster" has expanded to a language of risk. 
Within this framework, the likelihood of sexual abuse committed 
by ex-offenders becomes a distinct hazard that can be fully regulated 
and eliminated. Regulating away this danger quells anxiety related to 
the uncontainable risk. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Sex offender legislation is both disproportionate and misdirected. 
Existing regulations respond to fears of situations unlikely to occur, 
while not addressing the present problems. Advocates push these 
laws as necessary for the protection of children, yet they have not 
been shown to reduce sexual abuse. The enforcement and 
prosecution of these laws consume copious resources and prevent 
state agencies from pursuing other crime. Nonetheless, legal 
restrictions aimed at sex offenders continue to proliferate as society 
propels them forward with ardent fervor. 
A new framework is necessary to analyze sex offender statutes, 
examining the rising fears about sexual abuse and resulting 
legislation through the lens of Ulrich Beck's risk society.264 Scholars 
have traditionally applied a moral panic framework to the scares of 
sexual abuse and resulting legislation. 265 The explanation is more 
complicated. We face a state of perpetual moral anxiety, similar to a 
moral panic, but expressed through a risk society and legislated 
through the resulting lenses. 
In this transformed moral panic, the populace turns to the sex 
offender menace as a way to harness a controllable fear. This helps 
subdue anxiety about other harms that are difficult to control or even 
comprehend. The larger context of the risk society results in an even 
greater impacting moral panic. It creates a response that is ongoing, 
and applies increased government control and surveillance as we 
become used to-and expect-such government interference. These 
factors indicate that this "moral panic" will not fade away. The 
263. See Janus, supra note 236, at 587; supra note 253 and accompanying text. 
264. See discussion supra Part LA. 
265. E.g., Horowitz, supra note 118, at 143-44; Kelly, supra note 118, at 553. 
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conditions exist for the panic to persist as long as the risk society 
continues. Appropriate classification creates a theoretical basis to 
trace what is happening, analyze why it happened, and project the 
future of what will happen. 
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